United States Class Actions in Private International Law Decisions by Truax, Sara Lloyd
California Western Law Review 
Volume 23 Number 2 Article 7 
1987 
United States Class Actions in Private International Law Decisions 
Sara Lloyd Truax 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Truax, Sara Lloyd (1987) "United States Class Actions in Private International Law Decisions," California 
Western Law Review: Vol. 23 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
United States Class Actions in Private
International Law Decisions
INTRODUCTION
When a case involving multiple state or international contacts is
brought to trial in a United States federal court, that court must
decide which state's or country's substantive laws should be ap-
plied.' Class actions, especially diversity class actions, 2 can involve
a multitude of state or international contacts. As a result, choice
of law decisions can become especially difficult.3
A number of different choice of law theories are used in the
United States and still other methods of choice of law are used
internationally. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in
its discussion of which laws were applicable to a contract dispute
between the United States and Mexico, stated:
Any contract which is not a contract between States in their
capacity as subjects of international law is based on the munici-
pal law of some country. The question as to which this law is
I. The need to assess which state's or country's laws are applicable to a case arises
out of the concern for respecting state sovereignty and the concept that each state or coun-
try may enact and uphold laws which govern people and events which take place within,
but not beyond, its boundaries. See discussion of the vested rights theory under the tradi-
tional approach, infra notes 55 to 73 and accompanying text. "The world is composed of
territorial states having separate and differing systems of law. Events and transactions oc-
cur, and issues arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one state, mak-
ing necessary a special body of rules and methods for their ordering a resolution." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
2. "Diversity of parties" refers generally to parties who are citizens of different
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) describes diversity as existing in situations where the par-
ties are
(1) citizens of different states;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens and subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state ... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Class actions, a statutory device which allows one or more people to sue on behalf of a
group of injured parties, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23, were designed to reduce the time and
expense involved in numerous individual litigations of the same or substantially similar
issues. See Comment, Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47
ALA. L. REV. 1180 (1983), for a description of the process as it relates to this subject. See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
3. For example, in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F.
Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the class was composed of plaintiffs from virtually all of the
fifty states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia as well as from a number of foreign
countries. The court noted as significant to the choice of law problem the fact that the
allegedly wrongful activities of the defendants had significant contacts with at least twelve
different jurisdictions. Id. at 692, 706.
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forms the subject of that branch of law which at the present day
is usually described as private international law or the doctrine
of the conflict of laws. The rules thereof may be common to sev-
eral States and may even be established by international conven-
tions or customs, and in the latter case may possess the charac-
ter of true international law governing the relations between
States. But apart from this, it has to be considered that these
rules form part of municipal law."
Current theories of choice of law fail to provide adequate guide-
lines for the resolution of class actions. United States choice of
law theories were developed prior to the current popularity of
class actions and, therefore, made no provision for the numerous
factors which would necessarily have to be weighed in the decision
making process. Because of the deficiencies of current choice of
law with regard to class actions, courts have failed to certify some
class actions.5 In other cases, the courts have applied choice of law
theories in unconstitutional6 or inadequately defined methods, 7
leaving future courts little guidance for handling subsequent cases.
The United States remains a forum for international torts liti-
gation. Much of this is due to the ever expanding role of interna-
tional business and the ease of transportation provided by modern
technology." Another reason for foreign plaintiffs to seek a United
States forum is found in American liberal recovery and discovery
laws.9This Comment will briefly review both international and do-
mestic approaches to the choice of law problem. Next, it will out-
line how choice of law theories fail to realize the policies they
were designed to address when applied to class actions. This Com-
ment then will propose a solution through the formulation of a
rule based on domicile.
4. P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21, at 41 (1929). Cf. Illinois Central R.R. (United
States v. Mexico), 1927 Opinions of the Commissioners 15.
5. See Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1984), discussed infra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
6. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), discussed infra notes
133-39 and accompanying text.
7. See "Agent Orange", 580 F. Supp. at 713, and infra notes 141-47 and accom-
panying text.
8. Baxter, International Conflict of Laws and International Business, 34 INT'L &
ComP. L.Q. 538, 539-41 (1985).
9. For example, the court in Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted the difference in wrongful death limita-
tions between Brazil, 100,000 cruzelros (approximately $170.00 at the time), and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, an unlimited damages provision.
1987]
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
I. ANATOMY OF A CLASS ACTION CHOICE OF LAW QUESTION
In a class action, plaintiffs are allowed to sue on behalf of a
group of individuals with similar claims.' The ability to sue as a
class was created by statute to reduce the time, effort and expense
involved in the litigation of multiple suits arising out of the same
set of facts.'
Class actions originally evolved from English equity cases and
were adopted in the United States under the old federal equity
rules.1 2 Although technically a joinder device,' 3 class actions vary
significantly from joinder.' 4 Today, class actions are governed by
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 which sets out a
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See also Comment, supra note 2, for a description of the
process as it relates to this subject, and Forde, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases:
Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 397 (1983).
II. Comment, supra note 2, at 1181. See also text of Rule 23, infra note 15.
12. J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN. CIVIL PROCEDURE 510 (1981).
13. Joinder is a process of combining numerous claims of relief into one action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
14. In joinder, all parties to all causes of action remain before the court; in class
actions, only the "representative plaintiffs" are actually before the court. See generally
FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20 & 23. The first rules that governed class actions were uncertain and
contained procedural restrictions which made suing under them difficult. J. LANDERS & J.
MARTIN, supra note 12, at 510.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b) provide:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(i) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with resfect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par-
ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
3
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number of prerequisites such as numerosity, commonality of law
or fact, typicality and adequacy of representation, all of which
must be met before parties can be certified as a class. 16
Rule 23(c)(2) gives class members the power to exclude them-
selves from the class.1 7 All members of the class are bound by the
judgment, favorable or not, unless they have excluded themselves.
The "opt out" aspect of the rule is significant in the choice of law
question because it creates the right of potential class members to
avoid the proposed rule by choosing not to participate in the class
action. Of course, that means they lose the benefits of the class
action as well.18
Some potential class actions meet their demise due to the choice
of law problem while still in the certification process.19 Since
plaintiffs are likely to be from numerous jurisdictions, all of whose
substantive law may vary with consequent varying applicable
laws, a court may find itself overwhelmed in choosing which sub-
stantive law to apply. Faced with this difficulty, some courts have
simply denied certification. The inability to form a class requires
plaintiffs to either sue individually or refrain from suing entirely.
If, however, a court were able to determine which jurisdiction's
law to apply, then only one lawsuit with the class as plaintiff could
be pursued. Thus, the ability to determine what law to apply to a
case can be critical to the maintenance of a class action suit.
In Zandman v. Joseph,20 for example, plaintiffs sought to have
a class certified to pursue a claim for damages arising out of the
Securities Exchange Act2 and common law fraud. Plaintiffs, in-
vestors from a number of states, alleged that defendant made mis-
representations and omissions over an extended period of time.22
The court refused to certify the class because under Indiana's
of a class action.
16. There are a number of prerequisites to becoming a class, such as numerosity,
commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. Aside from these, there are also
due process considerations and requirements of notice to possible class members, not to
mention the jurisdictional and venue problems associated with mass litigation. A complete
analysis of class actions is outside the scope of this Comment.
17. See Rule 23(c)(2), infra note 117. The right to "opt out" applies only to Rule
23(b)(3). This Comment addresses other forms of class actions as well, but arguments
based on the "opt out" clause relate exclusively to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
18. The opting out clause may also affect the defendant's decision whether to settle.
It is also important to note that not all class actions are governed by this clause. This factor
may weigh against the presumption when a court attempts to determine if another state
has a substantially greater interest. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
20. Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
22. These misrepresentations were made in press releases published in the Wall
Street Journal and regarded the progress, design, development, testing and marketability of
the Downhole Steam Generator. Zandman, 102 F.R.D. at 926-27.
1987]
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choice of law rule, the state fraud claims would have to be tried in
accordance with the substantive law of the state of each class
member."3
The proposed plaintiff class was also denied certification in
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,24 a suit which involved
multiple alleged violations of numerous consent decrees. 5 The
court stated that even though it was "more probable than not that
individual questions of law will inevitably predominate . . . the
court would be confronted with the necessity of applying as many
as thirty-two different states' rules" to the cause of action.26 The
states involved in both Coca-Cola Bottling and Zandman used a
choice of law theory which called for the application of the law of
the state in which the last act necessary for a cause of action oc-
curred. In these cases, the last act was the injury which occurred
in each of the plaintiff's domicile.17 Yet, in both cases, the plain-
tiff class and all of the relevant facts occurred entirely within the
United States and the federal government had no particular inter-
est in ensuring that the plaintiffs were successful in gaining recov-
ery. When the acts in question occur outside the United States or
the federal government has a stake in the outcome of the case,28
the choice of law question becomes even more difficult.
Despite the difficulties class actions may pose, many class ac-
tions do proceed beyond the certification process. However, the
choice of law question remains a substantial hurdle for courts to
overcome. To illustrate thoroughly why current choice of law the-
ories fail to meet the needs of class actions, a brief overview of
current approaches to choice of law is necessary.
II. THEORIES OF CHOICE OF LAW
The body of choice of law is designed to answer the question of
which state's laws are to be applied to a controversy in which the
23.
Indiana ordinarily follows the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule for torts, and thus
for a fraud claim uses the law of the place where the loss was suffered. That rule
would require use of the law of the state where each class member suffered his or
her pecuniary loss. Were the modern "most significant contacts" choice-of-law
rule applied, the analysis would be even more complex but would lead in the case
of most class members to application of the same law as under the lex loci delicti
rule.
Id. at 930 (citations omitted).
24. 95 F.R.D. 168 (D. Del. 1982). On reconsideration, the class was again denied
certification. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 81-48 (D. Del. Feb. 18, 1987).
25. Id. at 170.
26. Id. at 178.
27. Zandman, 102 F.R.D. at 930; Coca-Cola, 95 F.R.D. at 178.
28. See, e.g., "Agent Orange", 580 F. Supp. at 692, 706.
[Vol. 23
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laws of more than one jurisdiction could apply. 9 To make the
choice, a court will look at its own state's choice of law rules.3 0
Federal courts, when presented with a class action based on diver-
sity, apply the choice of law rule adopted by the state in which
they sit. 31 In the United States, choice of law rules are generally
created by case law; statutes rarely play a role in such decisions.
Both domestic and international choice of law theories histori-
cally lack consistency. Moreover, the American choice of law the-
ories have not been consistently applied and may require a court
to make difficult policy assessments regarding another state's
laws. 2 These theories will be discussed more fully after a brief
review of international choice of law concerns. International poli-
cies of choice of law may change from country to country, al-
though there is a continuing attempt to unify this body of law.3 3
A. Private International Law
Due to the liberal recovery laws found in the United States, this
country remains a popular forum for international torts. The pres-
ence of international contacts makes the choice of law decision
more difficult in international contexts, especially when questions
of forum non conveniens arise.3 In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,3 5
the United States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that her suit, which arose from a plane crash in Scotland,
should not be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
The dismissal resulted in the application of Scottish law, which
29. See W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF LAWS 2-3,
109 (1984). "Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which determines what
effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than one
state." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 2.
30. To begin its analysis, a court will look to its own choice of law rules to deter-
mine what facts will be relevant in making the choice of law decision. In other words, only
the substantive law of the other state is applied, not its choice of law doctrine.
The body of choice of law includes not only the choice of which law to use, but also
questions of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments. Questions of jurisdiction and en-
forcement of judgments are outside the scope of this Comment.
31. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The only time
choice of law is predetermined is when parties to a contract specify which law is to apply to
the contract. The proposal in this Comment is not designed to alter current law applicable
to a party's specified choice. See W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLD, supra note 29, at 216-17.
32. See discussion of interest analysis approach, infra notes 74-82 and subsequent
discussion of U.S. choice of law theories.
33. See generally Reese, The Hague Conference on Private International Law:
Some Observations, 19 INT'L L. 881 (1985).
34. Forum non conveniens "refers to discretionary power of court to decline juris-
diction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if action
were brought and tried in another forum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979).
See also Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 579, 555 P.2d 997, 999
(1976), reh'g denied 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
35. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
1987]
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the plaintiff argued was less favorable to her.36
The effect of forum non conveniens on the choice of law deci-
sion, which the plaintiff in Piper complained of, does not arise in
U.S. federal class actions as the transferor court can ensure a
change of court within the United States which does not result in
a change in the applicable choice of law rules."7 However, when
another country's courts are more convenient, a United States
court cannot require the application of American laws.38
As noted earlier, as world travel and trade becomes more fre-
quent, disputes with international connections occur more often.,,
When international disputes arise, courts must make the difficult
decision of which country's laws to apply. Municipal law concern-
ing choice of law varies from country to country,40 much as
United States choice of law varies from state to state.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law was
formed to attempt to unify rules of choice of law.41 To date, no
agreement on how to handle the choice of law problem in class
action suits has been reached. Currently, thirty-two States are
members of the Hague Conference.42 When the Conference has
prepared a convention, the member countries may choose to rat-
ify, or not to ratify, a proposal presented to them.4 a In light of this
flexibility, it seems unlikely that a uniform choice of law conven-
tion for class actions will be created, and universally accepted, any
time in the near future. The proposal presented in this Comment
may suggest a framework for such a convention. Until an attempt
is made to create uniform conventions, this Comment's proposal
may serve as a solution to problems encountered in United States
class actions with international connections.
36. id. at 238, 240.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). See Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
A complete analysis of forum non conveniens is outside the scope of this Comment.
38. The proposal of this Comment is designed to fulfill the international choice of
law question as well as the domestic question, although it is realized the application of the
proposal in the international realm may not always be appropriate. For an explanation of
the limitations, see discussion of fulfilling international concerns, infra notes 131-32 and
accompanying text.
39. Baxter, supra note 8.
40. See generally, Morse, Choice of Law in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 32 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 51 (1984).
41. Reese, supra note 33.
42. The members of the Hague Conference are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
43. Reese, supra note 33, at 881, 884.
[Vol. 23
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B. Domestic Choice of Law
Four choice of law theories are primarily in use in the United
States: 1) Traditional, 2) Interest Analysis, 3) Restatement (Sec-
ond) and 4) Choice-Influencing Considerations (Better Law). The
theories vary considerably in their approach; however, central ba-
sic purposes recur throughout choice of law approaches.44 The ba-
sic objectives of choice of law rules are providing uniformity and
protecting party expectations and territorial sovereignty. Another
significant objective is discouraging forum shopping.
1. Forum Shopping
Commentators have argued that the most significant goal of
choice of law rules is to discourage forum shopping."5 Their posi-
tion is based on the belief that substantive rights of the parties
should not vary depending on where a suit is brought. Professor
Cavers wrote in reference to a rule which would encourage forum
shopping by applying forum law absent a compelling reason not to
do so:
Not only is this denial of true justice, a denial of the purpose of
the conflict of laws, but also it is a denial of law itself. It pro-
vides no opportunity for certainty in the law. It makes it difficult
to plan transactions having interstate elements. Even after an
injury of some sort has occurred, there is, under such a rule, no
basis for advising a client as to his rights, or for settling or ad-
justing the dispute without litigation. 6
The need to discourage forum shopping is especially significant
in class actions. Because diversity class actions often provide
plaintiffs with a choice of several states within which to bring
their suits, given multiple contacts of the defendant with those
states, the potential arises for plaintiffs to affect the outcome of
the suit merely by the choice of which forum to sue in, and conse-
quently which choice of law doctrine and substantive law will be
applied.47 One of the only roadblocks plaintiffs may face is the
inconsistency sometimes found in the application of choice of law
rules. 8
44. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 200-03.
45. Id.
46. D. CAVERS. THE CHOICE OF LAW PRocEss 23 (1965).
47. Courts apply the choice of law doctrine accepted by the state or country in
which they sit. Supra note 30.
48. Personal jurisdictional questions may also arise. A full discussion of these poten-
tial problems are outside the scope of this Comment.
1987]
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2. Inconsistency of Application
The problems with inconsistent application of choice of law are
evident in many cases.49 For example, under the traditional ap-
proach, a court is able to "characterize" a plane crash as either a
tort or a contract issue to acquire the desired result.5 0 Characteri-
zation of the accident as a tort will result in the application of the
law of the state where the accident occurred. If characterized as a
contract dispute, the court will apply the law of the state in which
the contract was formed.5 1
Courts using other choice of law theories are able to mold their
results to some extent by manipulating the characterization of a
state's interest in a given case or by manipulating the legislative
purpose of another state in enacting the statute in controversy.52
For example, the purpose of a guest statute could be characterized
as assuring the priority of injured nonguests in the assets of a neg-
ligent host. The same statute could also be characterized as being
designed to prevent fraudulent claims against local automobile
owners.
5 3
To maintain the goal of discouraging forum shopping, this
Comment suggests a uniform means of handling class actions so
that the outcome of a suit would not rest on where the suit was
brought. Because even a uniform rule can be applied inconsis-
tently, the proposed domicile approach focuses on a simple inflexi-
ble standard. The proposal will also solve some of the problems
associated with the fact that the major choice of law theories also
vary in respect to one another.5 To better understand the incon-
49. W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 207.
50. See discussion of the traditional approach, infra notes 55-73 and accompanying
text.
51. W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 140. See generally R.
CRAMTON, D CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-56, 75-91 (1981).
52. For example, the Court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
(Stevens, J. concurring), reh'g denied 450 U.S. 971 (1981), discussed Minnesota's interest
in safeguarding the interests of its workers, but the worker whose interests were in question
was deceased (only his insurance policies were in question-not employment concerns) and
he had been a resident of Wisconsin. Id. at 314.
53. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 575-76, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523-24, 249
N.E.2d 394, 397 (1969).
54. The following is an example of inconsistent application of choice of law theories:
In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), plaintiff sued her husband for
child support under a New York separation agreement. The agreement provided in part
that the wife was not to bring any action relating to their agreement in any court. A year
after the couple signed the agreement and defendant had failed to make payments, plaintiff
brought a separation agreement in England (the marital home of the couple). The suit in
England was never brought to trial. Three years later in New York, defendant's new domi-
cile, plaintiff brought this action. The lower court applied New York law to the case and
upheld the defendant's defense that the wife's filing of the action in England repudiated the
separation agreement. This holding was reversed on the theory that the parties must have
[Vol. 23
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sistencies of these theories and how they relate to class actions, a
review of each of the major theories currently in use follows.
C. Traditional Approach
The traditional approach to choice of law is a territorial/power-
based approach founded on the vested rights theory.5 5 According
to Joseph Beale,56 the vested rights theory evolved from the idea
that when the event being sued on occurs in a state other than the
forum, a right to litigate the issue is created, if at all, according to
the laws of the state in which the last event necessary for recovery
occurs.57 Because laws are considered not to have extraterritorial
effect, 8 the existence and scope of that right can only be deter-
mined by the laws of the state in which the right was created. The
court's job is merely to give effect to the right which had vested in
the other state.59 The traditional approach, therefore, focuses on a
single decisive event. Broad rules were developed to govern each
major area of law. For example, in torts the state in which the last
act necessary to form the cause of action has its law applied. In
contract disputes, the state in which the contract was formed has
its law applied.60
The traditional theory focuses on which state's rules are to ap-
ply and not on the content of the rules themselves. If properly
applied, the traditional approach takes no notice of the content of
the foreign law until it has been chosen.6' However, in practice,
judges are aware of the applicable foreign law and find that a
blind application of the law of a state which has no interest at
stake can result in decisions contrary to both common sense and
equity.62 Judges have at times, therefore, considered local law and
molded their characterization of an issue in order to reach what
seems to be a more appropriate result.6
expected that English law (under which the agreement was still valid) would be applied.
Seven years later, another case also involving child support was brought in New York,
under similar circumstances. Although the same "theory" of choice of law was applied to
both cases, in this second case New York law was not found to be applicable even though
New York was the state, like England in Auten, where the mother was domiciled. Haag v.
Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
55. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 132.
56. Beale was one of the main proponents of the vested rights theory in the United
States. Id.
57. The right may also vest in the forum state depending on its state's laws.
58. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws and Their Role and Utility,
58 HARV. L. REv. 361, 365 (1945).
59. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 132.
60. See supra note 51.
61. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 135.
62. Id.
63. Id.
1987]
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The traditional approach to choice of law nevertheless has many
aspects which are appealing as a rule for choice of law questions
in class actions. It is simple to apply and discourages forum shop-
ping because, if all states used the traditional approach, the same
result would be reached regardless of the forum in which the suit
was brought. 4 The problem with this approach, as applied to class
actions, is determining what the one significant "contact" is. For
example, in a class action products liability case, how is the court
to choose one state's law if the last event needed to create the
right is the injury and there are plaintiffs who have been injured
across the United States and in numerous foreign countries? Ap-
plying numerous state and foreign laws to different plaintiffs does
away with most of the benefits of class actions.0 5
The application of a state's law when that state has no policy
interest in having its laws applied is described as a false conflict.
Babcock v. Jackson6 is an illustration of this concept. In Bab-
cock, the plaintiff and defendants, all New York domiciles, left
New York for a weekend trip to Ontario. While in Ontario, Mr.
Jackson's car was involved in an accident, injuring Mrs. Babcock.
Ontario law would have denied recovery by means of a guest stat-
ute, 7 while New York law would have allowed recovery. 68 Under
the traditional approach, the court, sitting in New York, would
have been required to apply Ontario law since the last act neces-
sary for Mrs. Babcock's injury-the accident--occurred in
Ontario.69
The New York court found that the purpose of the Ontario law
was to protect Canadian insurers from collusive law suits. 0 The
court further found the policy behind New York's relevant statute
was to require "a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
caused by his negligence .... Since there was no Ontario de-
fendant in the suit, the court saw no real conflict between the laws
64. This assumes of course the characterization problem does not arise. The
problems associated with multiple defendant class actions are addressed infra notes 112-
114 and accompanying text.
65. Although there would remain a single proceeding, that proceeding would in es-
sence be numerous trials applying the same facts to different laws. The time and effort
involved would not be much less than if separate trials were had. See Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 178 (D. Del. 1982).
66. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
67. Highway Traffic Act of the Province of Ontario, Otr. REV. STAT. (1960), ch.
172, § 105, subd. (2).
68. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
69. Id. at 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746, 191 N.E.2d at 281.
70. Id. at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting Survey of Cana-
dian Legislation, I U. TORONTO L.J. 358, 366).
71. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
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of the two jurisdictions. 2 In applying New York law, the court
noted that application of the "inflexible traditional rule" would
"lead to unjust and anomalous results. 7 3
When the combined problems of determining where the last act
occurred and the court's desire not to defeat the purposes behind
states' laws, the traditional approach becomes a difficult solution
for the class action choice of law problem. The desire to focus on
another state's interest in a suit was developed in the interest
analysis approach to choice of law.
D. Interest Analysis
In an interest analysis jurisdiction, the court first identifies the
substantive laws of the respective jurisdictions which apply to the
case.74 Next, it looks at the policies behind those laws to see
whether, in light of the factual situation present, application of
those laws will further any state interest.7 5 If application of a par-
ticullar state's laws will further that state's policy, that state is
considered to have an interest. 6
For example, in Tooker v. Lopez,7 7 the court refused to apply
the law of the state in which the accident occurred. The case arose
from the crash, in Michigan, of a Japanese sports car. Both pas-
sengers were college coeds from New York who brought suit in
New York. The defendant asserted the Michigan "guest statute"
as a defense. The court characterized the purpose of the Michigan
statute as preventing fraudulent claims against Michigan insurers
and car owners.78 Since the insurer involved as well as the car's
owner were New York residents, no purpose of the Michigan stat-
ute could be fulfilled. As a result, the court refused to apply Mich-
igan law. The court stated that application of Michigan law would
defeat New York's interest in the case without serving a legiti-
mate interest of Michigan. 9
One criticism of the interest analysis approach is that it is fo-
rum biased and thus leads to forum shopping. 80 In the event two
72. Id.
73. Id. at at 484, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
74. See W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 175-76.
75. Id.
76. If more than one state has an interest, then the court applies the law of the
forum. Id. at 182.
77. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 29 N.E.2d 394 (1969).
78. Id. at 571, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 520, 249 N.E.2d at 395.
79. Id. at 576, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525, 249 N.E.2d at 398.
80. See supra note 76. All a plaintiff needs to do is sue in the state which has the
law most beneficial to his case and prove that another state also has an interest in the case.
Of course, this will not be successful if there are jurisdictional problems or if the interest
analysis is not followed in that jurisdiction.
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states have equal interest in the litigation, forum law is applied to
the case.8' Another problem concerns the court's ability to assess
a foreign legislature's intent. A court could conceivably stretch the
assessment of a state's intent to dictate a desired result as easily
under the interest analysis approach as it does in the traditional
approach by characterization. 2 Further, the time, energy and
complexity of such a task in a class action would be monumental.
Other choice of law theories, although perhaps easier to apply
than interest analysis in class actions, pose substantial problems as
well.
E. Restatement (Second) Approach
The first step in the Restatement (Second) approach is to look
to the forum's choice of law statute if there is one.83 If no such
statute exists, which is usually the case in the United States, a
court next looks to a "presumptive rule." These presumptive rules
are much like the "rules" of the traditional approach only nar-
rower in scope. The purpose of the presumptive rules is to guide
the court in finding the state which has the most significant rela-
tionship to the suit such that that state's laws may be applied. For
example, the applicable law for a contract case is not governed by
a single "where the contract was formed" rule as under the tradi-
tional approach, but will depend on the type of contract case.8 4
81. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 16, 395 P.2d 543, 549 (1964):
We have, then, two jurisdictions, each with several close connections with the
transaction, and each with a substantial interest, which will be served or thwarted,
depending upon which law is applied. The interests of neither jurisdiction are
clearly more important than those of the other. We are of the opinion that in such
a case the public policy of Oregon should prevail ....
See also Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Western Airlines v. Sobieski,
191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
82. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note I, § 6(1): "A court, subject to consti-
tutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."
84. A contract for services is governed by § 196 of the Restatement (Second) which
provides:
The validity of a contract for the retention of services and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
by the local law of the state where the contract requires that the services, or a
major portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which the event the local law of
the other state will be applied.
Section 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
state in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
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These "presumptive rules" are not conclusive. Under section 6
of the Restatement (Second), if another state has a more signifi-
cant interest than the one in which the action is brought, then the
law of that state will be applied.85 To determine whether a state
has an interest, a court will look to the contacts the parties had
with that state as they relate to the policies behind the state's
laws. 6 The approach is designed "not merely to count contacts,
but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to
determine where these contacts are found."'87
Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) lays out the factors rele-
vant to determining how multiple state contacts are believed to
affect the choice of law decision. The factors are
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,(b) the relevant policies of the forum,(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the particu-
lar issue,(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.88
An example of how the Restatement (Second) approach works
is found in Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp.89 In Johnson, the
widow of a Kansas man who was killed in Kansas when the scaf-
fold he was working on gave way brought a wrongful death action
in Washington, where the defendant corporation was located and
where the pertinent evidence rested. Kansas limited wrongful
death awards to $50,000; Washington had no limit. The appellate
court reversed the trial court's conclusion that Kansas law applied,
basing its decision on the Restatement (Second) approach.90 After
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(A) the place where the injury occurred,
(B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties, and
(D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 158.
85. See W. RICHMOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 158-59.
86. See, e.g., Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, Co., 198
Colo. 444, 601 P.2d 1369 (Colo. 1979); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577,
555 P.2d 997 (1976).
87. Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 582, 555 P.2d at 1000 (citation omitted).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 6.
89. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997, (1976).
90. Id. at 580, 555 P.2d at 1000.
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looking to section 145, which sets out the general principles which
apply to torts, the court focused its attention on section 6.91
The Kansas statute was characterized as intending to protect
defendants from excessive financial burdens, to eliminate specula-
tive claims and to ease the difficulty of computing the appropriate
compensation. Washington's lack of a wrongful death limit was
characterized as intending to deter tortious conduct and to en-
courage the production of safer products. Because the application
of the Kansas statute would further no Kansas policy, the court
applied Washington's law. Washington's deterrent policy could be
furthered by the application of its law because a Washington
manufacturer was involved.
The Restatement (Second) approach seems to come closer than
the traditional or interest analysis approach to being manageable
in the class action suit. The problem with looking into every
state's laws and its policies still exists, but under the proposal in
this Comment, this can be mitigated in some respects if a court
focuses on the criteria expressed in subdivisions (e), (f) and (g):
party expectation, ease of application, and certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result. 2
To make this approach viable for class actions, however, "pre-
sumptive rules" which apply to class actions need to be written.
Because of the difficulty a court faces in applying the present pre-
sumptive rules to class actions, the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach is not a viable theory in the federal class action suits until
newly tailored presumptive rules and guidelines for their applica-
tion are developed.
F. Choice-Influencing Considerations
In a state which follows the choice-influencing considerations
approach, also known as the "better law" approach, a court will
determine choice of law questions by looking at the five basic
"choice-influencing considerations" for each interested state.93
These considerations were devised and explained by Professor Le-
flar and consist of "(A) Predictability of results; (B) Maintenance
of interstate and international order; (C) Simplification of the ju-
dicial task; (D) Advancement of the forum's governmental inter-
ests; and (E) Application of the better rule of law."94
91. Id. at 582, 553 P.3d at 1001.
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text and infra notes 116-20 and accompa-
nying text.
93, See generally LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW (3d ed. 1977).
94. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267, 269.
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Milkovich v. Saari," an automobile guest statute case, illus-
trates the application of this approach. In this case, a group of
Ontario residents set out for a shopping trip to Minnesota. An
accident occurred in Minnesota which had no guest statute. The
court applied Minnesota law even though Ontario had a guest
statute96 because the court was "firmly convinced of the superior-
ity of the common-law rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest
statute."
97
Criticism of this approach rests primarily on the fact that its
use "would result in the application of the law of the forum in
each case because every forum thinks it has created the best rule
of law . . . ."9 Another commentator stated that an approach
which bases its choice in terms of "the better rule of law" proba-
bly complicates the problem even further, unless general agree-
ment exists on the standard by which superiority is judged.99
Even if one is willing to overlook the subjectiveness of this ap-
proach, it still fails the essential purposes of class actions. There
can be no judicial savings of time and energy if the court is re-
quired to assess what the laws of each interested state or nation
require and then also look into the "quality" of those laws.
III. APPLICATION OF CHOICE OF LAW THEORIES TO CLASS
ACTIONS
As has been discussed, none of the four theories of choice of law
lend themselves well to international or domestic diversity class
actions brought in the United States. The traditional approach
may work in simple one accident mass tort cases,100 but in com-
plex cases, a court may have difficulty identifying the one signifi-
cant contact a state may have to the accident. For example, in a
case arising out of the defective manufacture of a drug that harms
plaintiffs around the world, would a court use the place or places
of manufacturing, the place or places of injury, or in a case of a
delayed injury (via long term side effects of a drug), the place or
places where the effect is first noticed? 10
95. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
96. Id. at 158, 203 N.W.2d at 410.
97. Id. at 171, 203 N.W.2d at 417.
98. Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 110, 585 P.2d 662, 664 (1978).
99. Von Mehrem, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L.
REv. 927, 952-53 (1975).
100. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 314 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
101. Questions regarding enforcement of U.S. judgments against foreign assets
clearly may arise. In deciding whether or not to use the suggested approach when a foreign
defendant is involved with a class action, a court will need to confront this problem and,
indeed, other problems such as the ability to prove foreign law. Explanation of both of
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The theories which require a court to look into a state's interest
in light of factual contacts there, as well as the legislative intent
behind relevant laws, create extensive choice problems for the
judge in a class action suit. Discovering the content of interested
states' laws is a time consuming task, and determining another
state's legislative intent may be impossible to accomplish in an
objective fashion.
Courts continue to struggle with these cases and the choice of
law problems they pose. After laying out the proposal, this Com-
ment will look at two class action cases and explain how the sug-
gested approach would have minimized the choice of law
dilemma.
IV. PROPOSAL
If class actions are to remain useful in diversity situations, some
solution to the private international law question is necessary. It is
unlikely that the solution will come from the Supreme Court, for
the Court will only scrutinize the constitutionality of application
of a choice of law under broad standards. 0 2 Thus, Justice Stevens
noted in his concurrence in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague'03 that
[i]t is not this Court's function to establish and impose upon
state courts a federal choice-of-law rule, nor is it our function to
ensure that state courts correctly apply whatever choice-of- law
rules they have themselves adopted. Our authority may be exer-
cised in the choice-of-law area only to prevent a violation of the
Full Faith and Credit or the Due Process Clause.
Perhaps the most logical way of dealing with the confusion
presented in class action suits involving multiple state interests is
to look to a law based on domicile. A choice of law approach
based on the defendant's domicile provides an easy solution to the
choice of law question. The proposal can be applied to multiple
defendant class actions with minor modifications. Further, because
the domicile approach incorporates at least partially existing
choice of law concerns (as expressed in the differing theories), ap-
plication of a domicile rule should not offend states' current
principles.
Domicile in American jurisprudence is a two prong inquiry
which looks not only to where a person resides, but also to his
intent to remain there. Domicile is "[t]hat place where a man has
these concerns is outside the scope of this Comment.
102. The state legislatures and Congress, having failed to draft conflict laws so far,
are also unlikely candidates for solving the problems of choice of law in diversity class
actions.
103. 449 U.S. 302, 332 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment,
and to which whenever he is absent he had the intention of re-
turning.' 04 A corporation has its domicile in the state of its
incorporation. 0 5
Domicile has traditionally played an active role in any choice of
law determination not only in terms of jurisdiction, but also in its
effect on the parties' intent or expectation of what law will be
applied.106 Domicile is also relevant in the determination of
whether a given statute was contemplated to reach the parties. 0 7
For the purposes of this proposal, domicile is defined as that one
state in which an individual resides with the present intent to re-
main indefinitely. With respect to corporations, domicile is that
one state in which the corporation is incorporated without refer-
ence to state or states in which it is presently doing business. For
purposes of the proposed solution to choice of law determinations,
domicile is to be fixed as of the date the cause of action accrued.
This proposal starts with a rebuttable presumption that the law
of the defendant's place of domicile should be applied to class ac-
tion suits. The domicile approach would reduce forum shopping
because the applicable law is fixed at the point the cause of action
accrues. 18 It also allows a defendant to plan its activities as it can
ascertain beforehand what laws will apply to it. °B
The state of the defendant's domicile may, in some cases, have
an interest which is considerably less than another state's interest.
Thus, the second prong to the approach directs the court to look
into certain factors on which choice of law decisions currently are
made. These factors are a) the nature of the relationship of the
parties; b) the parties' expectations; c) substantial policies of an-
other interested state or country; d) the nature of the field of law;
and e) the difficulty presented in the application or assessment of
the law." 0 If a court finds that there are one or more states with a
substantially greater interest in the case,"' the presumption that
the law of the defendant's domicile should apply gives way to the
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (5th ed. 1979).
105. Bergner & Englel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531 (1898).
106. See W. RiCHNIOND & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 5.
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 1, comment (a).
108. If all jurisdictions used this approach, the same law would be applied no matter
where the suit was brought. Therefore, there would be no need to forum shop.
109. By knowing what law will govern any tort suits a corporation may be involved
in, it can be sure to have adequate insurance or make any other necessary provisions regu-
lated by the nature of its business.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 6.
111. The Restatement (Second) requires merely a "more significant" interest on the
part of another state to defeat the presumptive rule. This approach requires a "substan-
tially greater interest."
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interested sovereign's laws.
This proposal closely mirrors the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach with the addition of a presumptive rule to govern class ac-
tions and a greater criterion to be met in order to negate the pre-
sumptive rule.112 Due to the number of parties involved in class
action suits, the number of interested states or countries could be
monumental. It is with this possibility in mind that the more sub-
stantial degree of interest of a forum, other than the defendant's
domicile, must be shown to rebut the presumptive rule. The party
desiring to rebut the presumptive rule has the burden of proving
that the other state has a substantially greater interest than the
state of the defendant's domicile. Placing the burden on the party
seeking to rebut the presumption will ease the court's task of ex-
amining the laws of numerous jurisdicitions.
When a court is faced with more than one defendant in a class
action suit, the court may choose to split the case in order for each
defendant to be tried according to the laws of its respective domi-
ciles. Although this may require plaintiffs to bring more than one
suit, it is less burdensome to both plaintiffs and defendants than
the bringing of numerous individual suits against numerous
defendants.
In this regard, it is important to note that the number of suits
will be limited by the number of defendants with dissimilar domi-
ciles. For example, assume that a class is made up of 500 injured
plaintiffs who have sued ten defendants. Assume further that four
of the defendants are incorporated in Delaware and the other six
are each incorporated in different states. If the presumptive rule is
rebutted, in other words if it is clear that one state has the most
substantial interest in the outcome of the suit, then that state's
law will be applied to all of the defendants despite the fact that
they are incorporated in different states. In such a situation, there
would be only one suit which applies the law of that substantially
interested state.
Presume, on the other hand, that the presumptive rule is not
rebutted-that no one state has an interest which is substantially
greater than the others. In that scenario, the action will be divided
into seven different suits, one against the Delaware corporations
and one against each of the other six corporations in their home
states. Although there will be seven suits rather than one, that
number remains a substantial savings to both the defendants, who
still defend only one suit, and to the plaintiffs, who now collec-
tively bring seven suits rather than the five hundred separate suits
112. Section 6 describes the considerations that the authors of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) felt were significant in a choice of law decision. See supra notes 83-87.
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which would be necessary if the plaintiffs were not certified as a
class. In another situation it may be possible, depending on the
nature of the case, for the finder of fact to make one finding appli-
cable to all defendants if the liability laws of the defendants' dom-
iciles are similar.'13 After ruling on liability, the court could then
apply the appropriate remedy as provided by the law of the de-
fendants' domicile. If the laws of the multiple defendants' states
are similar, a compromise of the applicable laws may be possible.
For example, if stockholders of several companies (all from differ-
ent states) sue the companies (incorporated in different states) for
alleged improper withholding of stock dividends and win on the
merits, a question may arise as to what interest is owed by the
defendants on the improperly withheld dividends. Assume that
one of the defendants is domiciled in a state allowing five percent
interest, and another defendant is domiciled in a state which al-
lows seven percent. The court may require the defendant from the
state calling for five percent interest to pay its share of the judg-
ment at five percent, and the defendant from the other state to
pay seven percent. Alternatively, the court may require the judg-
ment to be paid at six percent with the defendants being joint and
severally liable." 4 Lastly, the court may require that each defend-
ant be sued separately or that the amount of liability be deter-
mined separately after a joint decision on the merits. Since this
proposal is designed to be applicable to class actions brought in
the federal court of any state, it should attempt, to the extent pos-
sible, to be acceptable to any of the choice of law theories now in
use.
A. Fulfilling Domestic Concerns
1. Restatement (Second)
As previously discussed, the Restatement (Second) approach
starts with a presumptive rule designed to fit the particular ques-
tion being litigated. A court then looks to the factors set out in
section 6 of the Restatement (Second) to see if there is another
state which has a more significant interest than the state whose
laws would be applied under the presumptive rule.
For the proposed domicile approach to satisfy the policies of
states which follow the Restatement (Second) approach, the pro-
113. For example, personal injury law may be substantially the same in a number of
jurisdictions allowing one court to apply one set of laws to all defendants although in differ-
ent domilices.
114. A discussion of joint and several liability is outside the scope of this Comment.
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posal must itself meet section 6 criteria. The proposal satisfies
these criteria. First, the rule will fill the goal of satisfying "the
needs of the interstate and international systems"11 5 by providing
a solution to the choice of law problems in diversity class actions.
The goals of predictability and uniformity of result are satisfied
as well by having a law which is applied in a two step approach
with a limited number of variables. (The number of variables is
determined by the number of defendants with dissimilar domi-
ciles.) In a class action, predictability of result is especially impor-
tant as the majority of plaintiffs do not play an active role in the
litigation."' Their interests in effect are being represented by the
named plaintiffs. To make an intelligent decision whether to opt
out,117 unnamed plaintiffs must be afforded some certainty as to
what law will be applied to the suit. A defendant's decision on
whether to settle may also be colored by such knowledge.
The views of Erwin N. Griswold, quoted by D. Cavers, ex.-
plained the need for uniformity in very simple terms:
We will not ... fulfill the objectives of the conflict of laws, un-
less we can provide rules for cases under which the same cases
will be decided the same way no matter where the suit is
brought, to the extent that this is possible within the limits of
human frailty. We will not always be successful in achieving
uniformity, but we will surely have more success if we con-
stantly hold up uniformity of result as a major objective, and
recognize that there can be no true justice without it." 8
The domicile approach fulfills the "justified expectations" of the
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
116. It has been suggested that in tort cases, predictability of results is relatively
unimportant.
Predictability of results can be overlooked since basically this test relates to
consensual transactions where people should know in advance what law will gov-
ern their act. Obviously no one plans to have an accident, and, except for the
remote possibility of forum shopping, this test is of little import ......
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 161, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973).
This reasoning is not applicable to the class action suit, even in the case of a tort, in light
of the need to grant possible class members the knowledge necessary to intelligently decide
whether or not to "opt out" of the class.
117. There may be exceptions to the general opting out rules. Discussion of these
exceptions are outside the scope of this Comment. See J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, supra
note 14, at 951. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appear-
ance though his counsel.
118. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 22-23 (1965).
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parties (at least of the defendant119) by allowing them to know
beforehand which law will be applied to their case. Take, for ex-
ample, an airline. Certainly airline companies are aware of their
potential liability to passengers and provide themselves with pro-
tection in the event one of their planes crashes. If the laws are
reasonably certain, the airlines can take action to protect them-
selves in case of an accident, if they so choose. Under the pro-
posed law, there would be nothing to block a defendant from mov-
ing or reincorporating in another state that has laws more
beneficial to the type of activity in which it is engaged. It may be
that the corporation would rather remain in its present state to
take advantage of tax or other benefits, 120 but by having the op-
tion to choose its domicile, corporations cannot claim to be
prejudiced by a domicile orientated law.
Although on the surface the approach may seem to give the
potential defendants too much control or a motive to "forum
shop," there are four factors which limit this possibility. First, cor-
porations must decide where to incorporate based on many differ-
ent legal consequences: labor costs; taxes; proximity to their prin-
cipal place of business, etc. Therefore, potential liability in the
event they are sued by a class may not be determinative of the
decision of where to incorporate. Second, when large numbers of
people are involved with each other in a contract setting, the par-
ties are able to bargain for the choice of applicable law. There-
fore, a company's choice of where to incorporate will not be deter-
minative of what law will be applied. Third, states have an
interest in protecting their noncorporate citizens as well. It is un-
likely that states will alter their laws to encourage the immigra-
tion of large corporations without taking into consideration the
welfare of individuals. Fourth, the proposal's second step of analy-
sis is designed to meet this problem by allowing a court to sidestep
the approach when and if it is shown, for example, that a corpora-
tion is domiciled in a particular state solely to defeat the rights of
injured plaintiffs and there is another state which has a substan-
tially greater interest in the proceedings.
The proposed domicile approach takes into consideration the
goal of protecting "the relevant policies of other interested
states" 121 in the determination of the particular issue being liti-
gated. Although a given state with an interest may not have its
119. Since torts are unplanned, plaintiffs in a tort case will not have an expectation
of what law will apply.
120. The converse may also be true: For example, in 1980, Citicorp, a New York
holding company, announced its intention to relocate in South Dakota to take advantage of
higher rates allowed South Dakota law. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1980, at D15, col. 1.
121. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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"laws" applied, its interest is protected by ensuring that class ac-
tions remain a viable means for their residents to recover in mass
tort cases. 122 A domicile approach protects a state's interests as
well by protecting its continued ability to regulate its corporations,
even if its "laws" are not chosen to apply to the suit.
The domicile approach thus fills the criteria of section six of the
Restatement (Second). To a large degree, it also fulfills the goals
of the other choice of law theories.
2. Traditional Approach
The traditional approach looks to the one decisive event which
allows for recovery and applies the laws of the state where that
event occurred. Certain aspects of the approach are appealing to
the class action choice of law problem. The foremost is simplicity.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach incorporates similar, but narrower, types of rules. The pro-
posed domicile rule fits the policies of the traditional approach
very well.
As discussed previously, under a traditional approach a tort will
be tried according to the law where the injury takes place, and a
contract where the place of contracting occurred. Because the re-
sults of these rules often are not logical, courts take the liberty of
stretching their characterization of a case to reach a desired re-
sult. Once the characterization stretching trend began, the tradi-
tional approach's goal of creating uniformity was frustrated. The
domicile approach solves some of these characterization
problems.123 Since most of the characterization problems arise in
choosing between laws of different forums, it seems reasonable to
expect that characterization problems will diminish under this
proposal because in most cases only the law of the defendant's
domocile will be available to the court. Thus, this use of choice of
law is more likely to support the goal of uniformity.
The traditional approach's goal of discouraging forum shopping
122. This protection is much like the protection spoken of in Keeton v. Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In that case, Keeton brought suit against Hustler Maga-
zine for liable. The main issue presented was one of jurisdiction, but the court spoke of the
forum's interest in participating in a "law" which benefited the interest of all states:
New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States,
through the "single publication rule," to provide a forum for efficiently litigating
all issues and damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding. This
rule reduces the potential serious drain of libel cases on judicial resources. It also
serves to protect defendants from harrassment resulting from multiple suits.
Id. at 777.
123. The characterization problem may still present itself under the proposed ap-
proach, but the variable will be more often than not the given laws within a state, as it is
unlikely a court can manipulate the definition of domicile that this proposal adopts.
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is also maintained by the domicile approach. The law of the de-
fendant's domicile is applied regardless of where the suit is
brought. Although the rule may be rebutted, this can only be done
if the party seeking to impose another law maintains his burden of
proving that there is another state with a substantially greater in-
terest in the case than that of the defendant's domicile. The domi-
cile approach, therefore, fulfills the choice of law policies of states
using the traditional approach.
3. Interest Analysis
Courts which follow the interest analysis approach, with its
strong forum bias,124 will not be afforded the same protection of
its policies under the domicile approach. The domicile approach
focuses more on the defendant and its relationship to the suit than
on state policies which may or may not be involved.
The state in which a defendant is incorporated will always have
a significant interest in regulating the behavior of its corporations.
These interests range from the economic impact the presence of
numerous corporations may have on the state to the desire of
states to encourage the safe manufacture of products. Since that
state has an interest in the suit, the domicile approach and inter-
est analysis approach may result in the application of the same
state's laws.
Because the interest analysis approach is unrealistically difficult
to use with respect to class actions, courts which follow it may be
more willing to compromise on their policies than states which fol-
low other theories. One feature of interest analysis which will need
to be compromised is the requirement that the policies behind the
laws be determined. To fulfill this policy would mean that the
court would need to assess the law of any involved jurisdiction as
well as the purposes behind those laws. As applied to class actions,
this feature makes interest analysis unrealistic.
One major goal of interest analysis, however, is to have the
court apply the substantive law of a state only if that state has an
interest in the outcome of the suit. This goal is satisfied by the
domicile approach. A state will always have considerable concern
regarding litigation of issues relating to its corporations. States
which follow the interest analysis approach may also have an in-
terest in the availability and use of a rule which is uniformly ap-
plicable to class actions so as to protect its citizens should they be
injured in a mass tort.
124. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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4. Choice-Influencing Considerations (Better Law)
The fourth major choice of law theory currently in use is the
"better law" approach.125 The major problem with this theory as
it applies to class actions is its requirement that the court examine
the laws of every interested state to pick which is "better."' 126 Al-
though some believe this approach is too subjective and uncertain
to be valuable, the enormity of the judicial task is such that even
if these problems were cured, the usefulness of the approach in
class action suits is doubtful.
5. Summary
Admittedly, the proposal cannot fulfill the goals of every choice
of law theory, but an attempt to do so may result in a law which
is too inflexible to be of use.
Unfortunately, no single choice of law principal is intuitively
correct. Nor does it seem likely that Congress will do a more
adequate job in the choice of law field than have the states.
Thus the drafting of a federal choice of law statute presents seri-
ous difficulties. If the text is highly precise, there is a risk that
there will be insufficient flexibility to permit courts to produce
sensible results. Conversely, legislation that provides the courts
with significant discretion is likely to produce inconsistent results
and offer little predictability. 27
The domicile approach comes close to fulfilling the important
goals of each of the current choice of law theories, while still pro-
viding the courts with an easy to use means of handling the pri-
vate international choice of law decision in diversity class actions.
Moreover, the suggested approach meets the constitutional test for
choice of law laid out in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague:128 "[Flor a
State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permis-
sible manner, that State must have a significant contact or signifi-
cant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."' 129
The significance of the Allstate holding is that for the choice of
125. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
127. Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Mulitstate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE Li. 1, 79 (1986).
128. 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 312-13. In Allstate, a resident was killed in a Wisconsin traffic accident.
Id. at 305. After his death, but prior to bringing the suit, decedents wife moved to Minne-
sota, the state of decedent's employment. Id. Minnesota law would have allowed the plain-
tiff to "stack" the decedent's insurance policies, but Wisconsin law would not. (The plain-
tiff sought to have the coverage of each of her husband's three insurance policies "stacked"
to afford her three times the amount recoverable.) The Court upheld Minnesota's applica-
tion of its own stacking law.
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law decision to be constitutional, the law chosen must be that of a
state which has significant contacts, but not necessarily the most
significant contacts.1 30 Under the domicile approach, the state of
the defendant's domicile will have a significant interest in regulat-
ing the activities of its corporations or citizens. Thus, the domicile
approach meets the constitutional standards for choice of law
theories.
B. Fulfilling International Concerns
The domocile proposal should be viable internationally in most
situations. As noted earlier, the application of the law of the de-
fendant's domicile should give way when there is another state
which has a substantially greater interest in the case. This type of
situation is likely to arise in cases where the plaintiffs are United
States citizens and the defendant is a foreign corporation. When
the foreign law provides little or no recovery, a United States
court may find it offensive to apply such a law. When this hap-
pens, the court can choose to apply another state's law.'
When the defendant is a domestic corporation, the domicile law
should apply whether the cause of action arises within the United
States or in a foreign country. For example, if, as a result of if the
Bhopal incident,13 2 a class action suit had proceeded in the United
States, the laws of the state in which Union Carbide was incorpo-
rated would have been an appropriate state's law to apply. In such
a case, the defendant would be familiar with the laws of that state
and could purchase insurance to protect itself or take other appro-
priate actions such as lobbying for limitations on damage awards.
It is unlikely that a domicile based rule will be considered offen-
sive to the principles of justice recognized by most developed legal
130. In a footnote in Allstate, Justice Brennan stated the "Court has since aban-
doned the weighing-of-interests requirement." Id. at 308 n.10 (citations omitted). Under
this proposal, the concerns of each choice of law theory are merged to solve the choice of
law problem. In this respect, the proposal is not unlike that "consensus" approach of In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In
"Agent Orange," Judge Weinstein concluded it was "unnecessary to consider whether any
state's conflict of law rule would deprive a litigant of due process, equal protection, or other
constitutional right since each of the states whose conflict rule might apply has sufficient
nexus with the matter through residence and the like." Id. at 694.
Given the domicile approach of the proposal, the constitutional problems are equally
eliminated. As well, other states will have an interest in the continued application of the
rule so that class actions can be maintained as an effective, cost efficient means of
litigation.
131. For example, the court might turn to the law of the state in which the defend-
ant is doing business in the U.S., or the law of the state in the U.S. in which the tort
occurred, etc.
132. See generally Comment, Parens Patriae Representation in Transnational Cri-
ses; The Bhopal Tragedy, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 175 (1987).
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systems. Therefore, its application in cases where the defendant is
a foreign corporation is appropriate. However, there may be na-
tional policies or perhaps treaties which need to be assessed before
the approach should be applied to a foreign defendant. Such an
inquiry should not be burdensome on the court as this information
is readily available.
In addition, there are international committees, such as the
Hague Conference of Private International Law, which may in the
future address international solutions to the problems of class ac-
tions. This proposal supplies them with the first step to achieve
that goal and, in the interim, provides a solution that is both effi-
cient and fair.
V. APPLICATION OF DOMICILE APPROACH TO CLASS ACTIONS:
AN EXAMPLE
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,33 the plaintiff class con-
sisted of royalty owners from all fifty states and some foreign
countries. The individuals possessed rights to leases from which
the defendant Phillips produced gas.134 The class sought to recover
interest on royalty payments that had been delayed.135 The states
involved had varying limits on the amount of interest required to
be paid on the withheld royalties."3 " Only a few of the plaintiffs
were from Kansas, the state where the suit was brought.
13 7
The lower court's decision to apply Kansas law absent "compel-
ling reasons" to apply a different state's law was deemed unconsti-
tutional."'8 The Supreme Court determined that the defendant
and royalty owners did not have a sufficient aggregation of signifi-
cant contacts to make the application of Kansas law
constitutional. 139
The effect of this holding requires that a trial court resolve the
133. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
134. Id. at 799.
135. Payments were delayed while defendant sought approval of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission for a price increase. Id. at 799-800.
136. Id. at 816-17.
137. The final class consisted of 28,100 members, but fewer than 1,000 of these were
from Kansas. Id. at 815-16. Kansas law allowed fifteen percent interest to be paid on the
withheld royalties. Id. The laws of other states varied. An Oklahoma statute-Oklahoma
had 2,653 royalty owners (the second highest number)-if applied, would have excused
defendant's liability because the royalty owners accepted payment of the "full principal
without a claim for interest." Id. at 817 (citing OKLA. STAT.. tit. 23, § 8 (1951)). Texas
law, if applied, would have limited interest payments to 6%. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S.
at 817 (citing TEX. CoNsr. art. 16, § II; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5069-1.03
(Vernon 1971)).
138. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 823. The Supreme Court relied heavily on All
State Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
139. Phillips Petroleum 472 U.S. at 823.
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choice of law issue, not simply avoid it. What is unclear from this
decision is how a court is to resolve the issue. Present theories are
of little help to the court in its decision. The domicile approach
would solve the problem with little effort on the court's part. The
court need only apply the law of the state in which Phillips Petro-
leum is incorporated, as that state has an important connection
with the case and the defendant. It is also that state's laws which
can best encourage fair dealings by its corporations, and it is that
state which will suffer economically if unreasonable financial bur-
dens are placed on its corporation.
If, on the other hand, the royalty owners can show the court
that there is a state with a substantially greater interest than the
state in which Phillips Petroleum is incorporated, then the court
can choose to apply that state's laws. In this case, the showing of
a state with a substantially greater interest is likely to be impossi-
ble as all states in which royalty owners reside will have only an
interest in safeguarding the interest of their residents that is equal
to the interest of Phillips Petroleum "home" state in regulating
the activities of its corporations. Without the application of the
domicile approach, one can only wonder if the holding in Phillips
will result in more judges following the example of Zandman v.
Joesph,'140 and simply failing to certify a class when the proposed
class is likely to bring with it significant choice of law problems.
Even in cases where the choice of law decision was made, insuf-
ficient guidance was given to aid future courts. For example, in In
re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,141 Vietnam War
veterans and their families brought a class action suit against the
manufacturers of Agent Orange to recover for injuries they sus-
tained from exposure to the herbicide. 142 In "Agent Orange,"
choice of law problems were intensified by the fact that state cases
from a number of jurisdictions were merged into one. This neces-
sitated the court's use of the choice of law rules that each of the
original forums of the now merged cases would have applied. Sud-
denly, the court was faced with the need to somehow pull all the
methods of choice of law used by the respective jurisdictions into a
single rule. The court concluded that "there was no rational
method by which a state court could choose the law of any one
state to govern the issue"'43 and that "the relevant decisions of the
various states indicated that they would look to federal or national
140. 102 F.R.D. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
141. 580 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
142. Id. at 962, 693.
143. Id. at 692.
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consensus law." 144 This law was not defined. 45
Even if the court in "'Agent Orange" had spelled out the content
of the national consensus law, that law would not be applicable to
diversity class actions in general. This is because the decision to
use federal law, or national consensus law, rested to a large degree
on significant federal government interests in protecting its ser-
vicemen and the willingness of manufacturers to produce military
supplies for the government. 46 These same dual sided governmen-
tal interests will not be found in most class actions. 47
If the "Agent Orange" court had applied the domicile approach,
each of the eight defendants could have been held liable under the
statutes of the states in which they were domiciled. It would have
been irrelevant that the litigation was composed of several merged
cases, as the states in which each of those cases were originally
brought would have had an interest in following the approach to
ensure a quick and equitable solution to the controversy. The
domicile approach just may be the uniform law the "Agent Or-
ange" court was striving for.
CONCLUSION
When a class action containing multiple state and international
contacts is brought to trial, the court must determine what effect
is to be given to these contacts. Current choice of law theories
provide inadequate guidelines for the resolution of the choice of
law issue. These deficiencies have resulted in the lack of certifica-
tion of some class actions and have resulted in unconstitutional or
open ended application of the choice of law doctrines in others.
Four choice of law theories are primarily used in the United
States. These theories are not consistent in their goals, nor uni-
form in their application. Each of them possesses unique difficul-
ties in its application to class actions. The traditional approach
presents, among other difficulties, the need for a court to be able
to determine what one of the multiple state contacts present con-
stitutes the "last act" necessary to establish the right to litigate.
Application of the interest analysis approach requires that the
court assess the laws, and the policies behind those laws, of each
state or country which has a connection with the case. When the
number of states or countries involved is large, this can present an
impossible task. The Restatement (Second) approach requires
144. Id. at 706.
145. Id. at 708.
146. Id. at 713. The case was later settled so that the question of what national
consensus law is was never answered.
147. Id. at 706.
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much the same assessment of a state's interest as the interest
analysis theory but lacks presumptive rules which are applicable
to class actions that involve anything more than a simple tort. The
choice influencing consideration ("better law") approach, which
again necessitates the investigation into concerned states' policies,
results nearly always in the application of the forum law, and thus
encourages forum shopping.
The domicile approach proposed by this Comment provides cer-
tainty to the parties by the application of a rule which cannot be
rebutted unless a substantially greater interest of another state is
shown to exist. Such a significant interest will be so obvious that
the approach will leave parties able to settle or "opt out" intelli-
gently.The proposal also provides uniformity in that it may be
equally applicable across the United States and is viable interna-
tionally. Uniformity of results and certainty of application will al-
low parties to form protectable expectations of what laws will be
applied to them in their dealing with others. Thus, the parties will
be able to plan their activities accordingly.
Perhaps the most important result of the domicile approach is
the protection of territorial sovereignty provided by the discour-
agement of forum shopping and by the assurance that states will
be able to regulate their residents, or corporations, in actions
which affect a multitude of people. Choice of law decisions are
difficult in almost any setting, but they are intensely so in the area
of class actions. There is a growing need for a simple, certain and
fair means of determining which substantive law to use in federal
diversity class actions. Not only is the need clear, but the solution
is within reach. Of the major theories of conflict of law choices,
not all agree on the importance of any one criteria, but most agree
that in an analysis of the goals or purposes for choice of law, not
one factor can be decisive. The weight of the criteria must neces-
sarily vary according to the problem presented and, in some in-
stances, one factor may have to give way completely to satisfy
another.
Like most solutions, the domicile approach does not come with-
out a price. State policies will need to give a little in accepting a
rule which may not fit the exact mold of their current choice of
law procedure, but the benefit to be gained is certain to outweigh
the cost.
SaraLloyd Truax*
* This article is dedicated to Dr. Elizabeth Truax for her considerable emotional and
financial support during law school.
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